On September 09, 2009 aMotion,Ex Partewas filedinvolving a dispute betweenTaylor , Christina,Taylor , Kenneth,andMaya , Jorge Arroyo,Shanrock Holdings Inc,for PERSONAL INJURY VEHICLE (GEN LIT )in the District Court of Travis County.
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Filed10 September 30 P4:43Amalia Rodriguez-MendozaDistrict ClerkTravis DistrictCAUSE NO. D-1-GN-09-003026 D-1-GN-09-003026CHRISTINA TAYLOR and KENNETH § IN THE DISTRICT COURTTAYLOR, Individually and As Next §Friends of DELANIE TAYLOR and §TAYLIN TAYLOR, Minors §Plaintiffs, §§v. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS§JORGE ARROYO MAYA, Individually §And as Representative of SHANROCK = §HOLDINGS, INC. d/b/a GLASS §DOCTOR and SHANROCK §HOLDINGS, INC., d/b/a GLASS §DOCTOR, §Respondent. § 250™ JUDICIAL DISTRICTMOTION TO QUASH DEFENDANTS’NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE DEPOSITION,AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERTO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:NOW COMES DAN CHRISTENSEN and LISA CHRISTENSEN and files thistheir Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order, and would show the following:[,FACTS1. Dan Christensen is an attorney with the Carlson Law Firm who representsPlaintiffs.2. Lisa Christensen is Dan Christensen’s wife. Exhibit A.3. HelpNet, LC and LoanStar Bridge Funds, LC, are Texas limited liabilitycompanies that purchase or factor medical receivables. They both purchasedsome of the medical bills pertaining to Plaintiffs treatment. LoanStar BridgeFunds has since been dissolved. Exhibit A.Dan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage | of 114. Dan Christensen owns and operates MedStar Funding (“MedStar”). MedStar alsopurchases or factors medical receivables. MedStar did not, however, purchaseany of the medical bills pertaining to Plaintiff's treatment. Exhibit B.5. Lisa Christensen was previously an employee of LoanStar Bridge Funds, prior toits dissolution. Ms. Christensen is currently an employee of MedStar. Exhibit A,6. Defendant has been provided documentation showing the sale and assignment ofthe relevant medical bills, namely:a. All medical bills with CPRC 18.001 affidavit;b. All assignments of interest between Plaintiff and his medical providers;c. All Notices of Sale reflecting HelpNet and LoanStar Bridge Funds’purchase of the medical bills from the relevant medical providers;d. Notice of Assignment listing total amounts due HelpNet; andit A and C.' e. Check stubs showing proof of payment. See Ex!7. HelpNet has offered to disclose more documentation underlying its purchase ofthe relevant medical bills under the terms of a Protective Order, however,Defendant has refused thus far. See Exhibit A. 8. Plaintiff incurred the full amount of the relevant medical providers’ bills at thetime of service. HelpNet now owns those subject medical bills. Plaintiff is nowresponsible for paying HelpNet the full amount of the bills, regardless of theoutcome of this litigation, and regardless of the amount HelpNet paid for thosebills. See Exhibit A.' HelpNet’s initial response to Defendant’s Deposition upon Written Questions was incomplete andcontained inaccurate information. Upon being alerted to this fact, HelpNet’s counsel, Ted Smith, withCornell Smith, in Austin, Texas amended HelpNet’s response and that is included as Exhibit B to thisMotion.Dan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 2 of 119. September 27, 2010: At approximately 9:00 p.m., Defendant’s attorney servedDan and Lisa Christensen by personal service at their family’s residence Noticesof Intention to Take Oral Deposition with Subpoena duces tecum. See Exhibit D.10. September 30, 2010: Dan and Lisa Christensen filed this Motion to Quash andMotion for Protective Order. The Motion was filed within three business days,therefore. the deposition is automatically stayed. TRCP 199.4.1]. Dan and Lisa Christensen request this Court grant their Motion to Quash andMotion for Protective Order. Defendant’s subpoena duces tecum seeksinformation that is irrelevant, confidential and outside the scope of permissiblediscovery.Il.ARGUMENTDefendant’s deposition notice with subpoena duces tecum sets the depositionat a time when deponents are unavailable.Defendant’s deposition notice with subpoena duces tecum requestsinformation that is overbroad, outside the scope of permissible discovery.irrelevant and could not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.Defendant’s deposition notice with subpoena duces tecum seeks informationthat is confidential, privileged, proprietary and private which, if disclosed,would compromise business relationships with other persons and entities.infringe upon deponents’, Plaintiffs’, or other persons or entity’s privacyinterests, irreparably injure these entities’ competitive position in the market,Dan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 3 of 11and expose these entities and deponents to claims for damages or suits forother relief. TRE 507. See Exhibit A and B.D. Defendant’s deposition notice with subpoena duces tecum violates TRE 403because: its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice; it seeks information that is cumulative with the billingrecords being provided via subpoena; and it will result in undue delay.Il.MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER For the reasons cited above, Dan and Lisa Christensen request this Court quashDefendant’s deposition notice with subpoena duces tecum, and enter a protective orderpursuant to TRCP 192.6(b) from Defendant’s improper discovery efforts.Respectfully Submitted,CREWS LAW FIRM, P.C.701 Brazos, Ste. 900Austin, Texas 78701(512) 346-7077(512-342-000 By: iJoa K,CrewsN: 0 ol /,Attomey\for Dan and Lisa Christensen SBN:Dan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 4 of 11CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby certify that on this 77 day of. RBA 20/¥, in accordance withRules 21 and 21a, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the followingcounsel of record:Cassandra Charles(512) 527-0398 FAXAttorney for PlaintiffsTed Smith(512) 328-1541 FAXAttorney for HelpNetRoss Pringle(512 476-5382 FAXAttorney for Defendants Dan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 5 of 11CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-09-003026CHRISTINA TAYLOR and KENNETH § IN THE DISTRICT COURTTAYLOR, Individually and As Next §Friends of DELANIE TAYLOR and §TAYLIN TAYLOR, MinorsPlaintiffs,v. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXASJORGE ARROYO MAYA, IndividuallyAnd as Representative of SHANROCKHOLDINGS, INC. d/b/a GLASSDOCTOR and SHANROCKHOLDINGS, INC., d/b/a GLASSDOCTOR,Respondent.LLLP LL UP UN LD MOD250" JUDICIAL DISTRICTORDEROn _ ss day_— off . 2010, the Court considered DANCHRISTENSEN and LISA CHRISTENSEN’S Motion to Quash and Motion forProtective Order.Having read the objections and motion, and having heard the argument ofcounsel, and considered the same, it is the opinion of this Court that said Motions aremeritorious. Therefore, DAN CHRISTENSEN and LISA CHRISTENSEN’S Motion toQuash and Motion for Protective Order are GRANTED.IT IS THEREFORE. ORDERED that the Defendant’s Deposition Notices for DanChristensen and Lisa Christensen be QUASHED.SIGNED on +20.PRESIDING JUDGEDan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 6 of 11EXHIBIT AEXHIBIT ACAUSE NO. D-1-GN-09-003026CHRISTINA TAYLOR and KENNETH § IN THE DISTRICT COURTTAYLOR, Individually and As Next §Friends of DELANIE TAYLOR and §TAYLIN TAYLOR, MinorsPlaintiffs,v. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXASJORGE ARROYO MAYA, IndividuallyAnd as Representative of SHANROCKHOLDINGS, INC, d/b/a GLASSDOCTOR and SHANROCKHOLDINGS, INC., d/b/a GLASSDOCTOR,Respondent.OP OD UR COP UR ID LD OP UD LD LD ED2507 JUDICIAL DISTRICTAFFIDAVIT OF DEBORAH FOSTERBefore me, the undersigned notary, on this day, personally appeared DeborahFoster, a person whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath to her, uponher oath, she said:“My name is Deborah Foster. I am over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, andcapable of making this affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personalknowledge and are true and correct.HelpNet, LC (“HelpNet”) and LoanStar Bridge Funds, LC, (“LoanStar”) areTexas limited liability companies that purchase or factor medical receivables frommedical providers who are looking to increase or regulate their cash flow and reduce theirtisk from treating injured patients who have third party claims or lawsuits. LoanStar andHelpNet are not parties, factual witnesses or treatment providers in this case. LoanStarand HelpNet simply provided a service to certain of Plaintiff's treaters who wereinterested in selling their accounts receivable.LoanStar has since been dissolved, When LoanStar dissolved, it transferred thetight to collect the medical bills it originally purchased to HelpNet.Lisa Christensen is Dan Christensen’s wife.Neither Dan nor Lisa Christensen have ever owned any portion of LoanStar orHelpNet and have never financially benefitted from these entities’ operations. NeitherDan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 7 of 11Dan nor Lisa Christensen have ever owned any portion of any of the medical billspurchased by LoanStar or HelpNet, including Plaintiffs bills. Lisa Christensen was anemployee of LoanStar prior to its dissolution, however, she was unpaid. Lisa Christensenis currently an employee of MedStar.Prior to receiving medical care, Plaintiff executed an Assignment of Interest withsome of her medical providers. Plaintiff assigned to these medical providers an interestin her recovery in the amount of the medical providers’ bills. Plaintiff executed thisassignment in exchange for the medical providers delivering medical care to her. Afterproviding Plaintiff medical care, the medical providers, at their option, sold theiraccounts receivable to LoanStar and HelpNet.At that time, LoanStar and HelpNet became the owner of the medical providers’bills and assignments of interest. Plaintiff now owes HelpNet the full amount of themedical providers’ bills, regardless of the outcome of her lawsuit or claim, and regardlessof the amount LoanStar or HelpNet paid for the bills. Documentation supporting thesetransactions were disclosed to the parties in this lawsuit, are attached to this Motion toQuash as Exhibit C, and incorporated herein as if set forth in full.HelpNet has offered to disclose additional documents regarding agreements withthe medical providers under the terms of a protective order, however, Defendant hasrefused. These records would reflect the price LoanStar and HelpNet paid for thereceivables in question, as well as the terms and conditions of the agreement betweenLoanStar, HelpNet and Plaintiffs providers. This information is confidential, privileged,proprietary and private. If disclosed, this information would compromise HelpNet’sbusiness relationships with other persons and entities, infringe upon HelpNet, Plaintiff, orother persons or entities’ privacy interests, irreparably injure HelpNet’s competitiveposition in its market, and expose HelpNet to claims for damages or suits for other relief.The price HelpNet pays medical providers for their accounts receivable isconfidential and, if disclosed, would allow HelpNet’s competitors to slightly outbidHelpNet and potentially steal HelpNet’s accounts. Additionally, this information couldharm the medical providers’ efforts to obtain much higher reimbursem*nt rates fromother finance companies. For this reason, the very terms of the agreement betweenHelpNet and the medical providers prevent either party from disclosing the price paid orterms of the agreement. Lastly, the price HelpNet paid Plaintiffs medical providers hasno effect on the amount Plaintiff owes HelpNet. Plaintiff incurred the full amount of themedical bills at the time of service and continues to remain responsible for the fullamount today.The terms and conditions underlying HelpNet’s agreement with medical providersis a trade secret, proprietary, and confidential. HelpNet has spent a considerable amountof time, energy, and legal fees in structuring this agreement. If the agreement were to bedisclosed and get into the public domain, it could lose its trade secret protection andwould be available to HelpNet’s competitors. One of HelpNet’s competitive advantagesDan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 8 of 11in its market is its legal expertise and ability to structure and execute a smooth and legallysound method for medical providers to sell their accounts receivable.”QsDeb FosterSWORN TO and SUBSCRIBED before me by Deb Foster on 24 day ofept, 2010.Notary Public in and for the 4State of TexasMy commission expires: Of 8 / { Y weit, MARIA CRISTINA REYESNotary Public, State of Texes My Commission ExpiresSeptember 08, 2014 Dan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 9 of 11EXHIBIT BEXHIBIT BCAUSE NO. D-1-GN-09-003026CHRISTINA TAYLOR and KENNETH IN THE DISTRICT COURTTAYLOR, Individually and As NextFriends of DELANIE TAYLOR andTAYLIN TAYLOR, MinorsPlaintiffs,y. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXASJORGE ARROYO MAYA, IndividuallyAnd as Representative of SHANROCKHOLDINGS, INC. d/b/a GLASSDOCTOR and SHANROCKHOLDINGS, INC., d/b/a GLASSDOCTOR,Respondent.§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 250" JUDICIAL DISTRICTAFFIDAVIT OF MARK BUTLERBefore me, the undersigned notary, on this day, personally appeared Mark Butler,a person whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath to him, upon hisoath, he said:“My name is Mark Butler. I am over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, andcapable of making this affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personalknowledge and are true and correct.Dan Christensen is the owner of MedStar Funding (“MedStar”). MedStar buys orfactors medical receivables from medical providers who are looking to increase orregulate their cash flow and reduce their risk from treating injured patients who havethird party claims or lawsuits. MedStar is not a party, factual witness or treatmentprovider in this case. MedStar did not purchase any medical bills pertaining toPlaintiff's treatment.Defendant’s subpoena duces tecum requests records that are private, privileged,proprietary and constitute trade secret. The requested records include personalinformation of employees, private investor information, records reflecting the priceMedStar pays medical providers with which it contracts, HIPAA protected information ofpatients unrelated to his lawsuit, attorney-client privileged and private information ofpatients represented by the Carlson Law Firm unrelated to this lawsuit, as well as theterms and conditions of the agreement between MedStar and medical providers. ThisDan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 10 of 11information is confidential, privileged, proprietary and private. If disclosed, thisinformation would compromise MedStar’s business relationships with other persons andentities, infringe upon MedStar, Plaintiff, or other persons or entity’s privacy interests,irreparably injure MedStar’s competitive position in its market, and expose MedStar toclaims for damages or suits for other relief.The price MedStar pays medical providers for their accounts receivable isconfidential and, if disclosed, would allow MedStar’s competitors to slightly outbidMedStar and potentially steal MedStar’s accounts. Additionally, this information couldharm the medical providers’ efforts to obtain much higher reimbursem*nt rates fromother finance companies. For this reason, the very terms of the agreement betweenMedStar and medical providers prevent either party from disclosing the price paid orterms of the agreement. Again, MedStar purchased no bills from any of Plaintiff’smedical providers pertaining to Plaintiff’s care.The terms and conditions underlying MedStar’s agreement with medicalproviders is a trade secret, proprietary, and confidential. MedStar has spent aconsiderable amount of time, energy, and legal fees in structuring this agreement. If theagreement were to be disclosed and get into the public domain, it could lose its tradesecret protection and would be available to MedStar’s competitors. One of MedStar’scompetitive advantages in its market is its legal expertise and ability to structure andexecute a smooth and legally sound method for medical providers to sell their accountsreceivable. Additionally, MedStar did not contract with any medical provider for thepurchase of any of Plaintiffs medical bills. ” Mark ButlerSWORN TO and SUBSCRIBED before me by Mark Butler on DY day of Sey2010,Notary Public in and for the 2State of TexasMy commission expires: ale | I a MARIA CRISTINA REYES‘otary Pubjic, State of TexasMy Commission ExpiresSeptember 08, 2014 Dan Christensen’s Motion to Quash &Motion for Protective OrderPage 11 of 11EXHIBIT CCONNIE CORNEEDWARD M. “TED” SM: SMI TH & CANPACE NEWELL LAMBDINMm SOONSEL ELIZABETH “BETSY” S. CHESTNEYIERL FeaisiveUIMGATIONREPRESENTING EMPLOYERS September 17, 2010VIA HAND DELIVERY Legal PartnersAttn: Victor Barron1609 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 310Austin, Texas 78701Brantley Ross Pringle, Jr.Wright & Greenhill, PC221 W. 6" Street, Suite 1800Austin, Texas 78701Cassandra CharlesTHE CARLSON LAW FIRM3410 Far West Boulevard, Suite 235Austin, Texas 78731Christina Taylor and Kenneth Taylor, Individually and as Next Friends ofRe:Delanie Taylor and Taylin Taylor, Minors v. Jorge Arroyo Maya, Individuallyine. d/b/a Glass Doctor, andand as Representative of Shanrock Holdings,Shanrock Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Glass Doctor, Cause No. D-1-GN-09-003026, Inthe 250" Judicial District Court of Travis County, TexasDear Mr. Barron, Mr. Pringle and Ms. Charles:Our law firm represents HelpNet, L.C. Pursuant to TRCP 193.5, HelpNet is amending itsresponses to defendants’ Deposition Upon Written Questions dated August 4, 2010, with theenclosed documents bates-stamped D397-D565, as such responses were discovered to beincomplete or incorrect when made, or are no longer complete or correct.Please contact me directly should you have any questions regarding this matter.Sincerely,Edward M. “Ted” Smith1607 West Avenue, Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512.328.1540 Fax 512.328.1541 www-corneHsmith.com<= HelpNet, L.c.NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT September 16, 2010‘The Carlson Law FirmAttn: Cassandra Charles3410 Far West Blvd., Suite 235Austin, Texas 78731Re: Christina Taylor Assignment of InterestDear Sir or Madame:As you know, your client, Christina Taylor entered into an “Assignment of Interest”with various medical providers, namely:Hyde Park Surgery Center $42,374.10Advanced Pain Care S 8,786.00Orthopaedic Specialists of Austin $27,177.68$18,534.70Worth Austin Sports MedicineThe above-listed amount(s) due is/are for the purchase of medical treatment and services thatwere rendered on or about December 12, 2008 thru June 1, 2010. I have enclosed copies of theassignment(s) signed by your client for your convenience.The total amount currently owed under the assignment(s) is $96,872.48.amount may change if additional treatment is provided, therefore, please contact us toconfirm the amount owed before rendering payment.The contract(s) has/have been assigned by the above-named medical provider(s) to us.Please make any payment to us at the address listed above and not to the medical provider. Allfurther correspondence regarding this account should be made directly to us. Disregard anysubsequent billing or account itemizations from the medical provider. [f your representation ofthis client is terminated, please notify us immediately.ThisPlease acknowledge receipt of this Notice of Assignment by signing below and fax’ingback to (856) 468-5042. Acknowledging this Notice in no way makes the Firm liable for itsclient’s debt, but rather, simply acknowledges that it has notice that the above-named provider(s)200 North Towns Mill, Georgetown, Texas 78626 (S12) 508-9896, (865) 468-5042 FaxD 0397has/have sold its/their interest to us and that the Firm will abide by the terms of the “Assignmentof Interest”? previously executed by the client.Thank you so much for your cooperation. If you have any questions, please do nothesitate to contact me.Sincerely,Deb FosterDeborah FosterACKNOWLEDGED:Signature: a _Name: i aTitle: a200 North Towns Mill, Georgetown, Texas 78626 {S12) 508-9896, (866) 468-5042 FaxD 0398\©dan 11. 2010 1:46PM mark malone No. 5150 Pp.Before me, the undersigned authority personally appeared the custodian of billing recordsawk T. Malone. , who, being by me duly sworn, deposed as follows:- Lam of sound mind, capable of making this in charge of the billing records of Mark T. Malone. M.D... Attached torecords (hat provide an itemized statement of the service and the chargeprovided to Christina Taylor on or about January 19,2009 thru September 24, 2009, ‘The attached billing records are a part of this altidavit.‘Phe attached records are kept by me in the regular course of business. ‘The informationcontained in the records was transmitted to me in the regular course of business by Mark TMalone, M.I2. or an employee or representative of Mark “T. Malone, M.D. who had personalknowledge of the information, ‘The records were made at or near the lime or reasonably soonafter the time that the service was provided, ‘Whe records are the original and an exact duplicateallidavit.T am the personthis affidavit are billingfor the service that of the original.The service provided was necessary and the amount charged forrcusonable at the time and place that the service was provided. the service wa CUSTODIAN OFBILLING RECORDS—SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on the { day of {¥_ 2010, Wotary Public, Statc of TexasPrinted Name: fe oS Loo iCMy commission expires: of D 0399No. 4873 Pho?ec. 30. 2009 10:25AM mark malonePONE_" ONTSTAR BREA (1500) 7302 BR 620 Now WH SUITE TGhb—-s3Ba gHEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORD ROGTING THK VNIAG &Fee oave 2a -_ a it.TSS 4185350862NEURONS WARE Want Naas, Fier iTAYT.OR, CHRISTINA _ eeFAURE AGBARES We. Blecd8600 RANCH ROAD 6Z0 WN ee eet nee TAICEDARS ROAD ox Monies SET oer Y PARK wereisi2 ea7--1062 costed] CASO RANBip Gane | tet BY GHGAGE KunasEit PLActe (StarePeto py NT ANG SURED MFORAMTION —————}-<¢,fees6 ontne ve woneereL_Jecsioe AGENTS Fo ne PR AFORATON ———————y jFvo1s1 _O230R43B717. Nate GP TEPERAING Prountt TOMES OTE SAT OTE Fi RENTS Ge TY, Geass Ha T S.GIARSES. PAYSIGAN OR SUPPLE s S6ioo is| Sse PREMERAI NARK OT MALONE, MD, ADVANCED 1002 ramble2 VALN CARs NOEAUSLIN CENTER ATVD, FTIR 20TRO VBTSI . 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Aeaontcterpsiosagcva 533921090 Lxfees ["Yxo« TPH RR PACITY TOGA YET WSF ORRAT RI ? aaADVANCED PATN GARR PROG craic, MALONE, MD,6000 So0nTh MOPAG ‘Sr 260 LO BOX 2GE893EAUSTIN, TR 78749 OKLAMNOMA CTTY OK 73226-2930 |TAWAQ POO [dG 7OETEEO eo BTAUTOSTZ50 fo." eeeWry Nace. OTe APPROVED GRE GE08-O808 FON CMS TENG Came)D 0402 MICS insvustion Manual avaieoia atDec. 2009 10: 264M mark malone(1500}HEALTH INGUA ANCE CLAIM FORMAPPROVED A HATIORAL Jittedtears | |ettoutonse a) |RO Paces sARae (a) BIOL YALL GEDA!caneDAR PARK senor) fren oreereehOR Sea os ve LessESEVED TTT No. 4873 PSLONBEWAL BRIDGE UND7501 RR 620 NORTH SUTTE 16b5p—-334AUSTIN, TK 78726 Tau nots KoniBeea ah| emer} "| BEQO RANChom*orl J ROAD Cor Biagiam is ene 1 PLOVER S Nal SEY SAT OH FECA NUME OR SGHOOL MAN “> |< PARES AND INSURED NFOEMATION cee Swe HaSr SATE Bi. DIAGNERS ON{MERC ODsions THAT HAR SANE ra] a GRIRIIAL FIED. B02.can z A a APBROVED OMS O988-O505 Pete pgavemsenr: jen worm. enbece Tae BOO OR ARSE BEERY nz loa js olookTreen pene TRS PROTOS ARS Ot. & yHt MARK + wa ae nae FE?Kd MALONE, Mm, ADVANGRDsee BO UBOx 2685365 ®GCRLAKOMA ELTY ox 73126-8938PHVSICAN OR SUPPLIER INSORUATION = NGG tiahuction barnial avainolo at: Wwonv NucorD0403Dec. 30. 2009 10:27AM mark malone No. 4873 P. 6LONESTAR BRLDGE FUND7201 RR 620 NORTH SoTTRAUSTIN, 1X 787261GSs-344 SLAM FiraCOMM FEE DAO ts Re " For Piscean tn Ba PP ARSUAEES ASDAESS (hs, BeadB60 RANCH 2 aS70 PALLene AAPARIS. © OTHER AGSIDENT?(C]ves(RESEINED FOR COE \Snnacat sebaedengs FO reek a.SorARRS||itIwl.BRATION, -———————___y a AND INSURED wironN, MOSHE OR NATURE OF NTNERS OF123223 OT Re ds age face CO SRRNCEone nowltient l= Sono bs RENO ASTICARR NORTH MARK T MALOWS, Mb, ADVANCED Li stCENTER BREYD, STR 20 PO BOX 260 8a1 OKLAHOMA £ ¥Y OK 73126-8938 i Pasion OF Supa ieR aca JAR OP ‘ 3use, pF ies 407164 1250IESE MIGHON Manian avalos NL wwe Georg APRA OVERS GETS)D 0404Dec. 30. 2909 10:27AM mark malone No. 4873 P.O?LONESTAK BRIDGE HUnD150) oo) 730% RR 620 NORTH SUTTR 16bs—334JEAUILTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORM AUSTIN, EX TO726 iAeine 3, RARBAGORBUREN S WASAYLOR, CHRTHEOS AMALES ©R600 RANCH ROAD G20 N #411periv : ASS Na. Suse”SDARS ROAD pre726EOS POUT GROUP OA FESUSURED (NEQRUATION —————h< Gagasa—s WEAVE NAME OF SCHOOL Nate[ aaa TAN BASEEO Te Or ha. a] — _RGAE BA PR RE ATo foals 5So7612 ) 899-322:Mp, RoVARGED PRONSRLANOMA OTT OK “SAT 26-8958stone I2-AGE2OCS (4 407057250 Ee 7407057250 fF -APPROVES GMS G538-0959 FOAM ORME-ihoe (GalanRES (rsteoction Manual avalah ORED 0405 abo;|e phacant-wurds2a PERN Ersot 1 043004 NOR TCBVO, BTE 204 BBYE Gs.RGOSTIN PX Com PHYSICIAN O02 SURF CASHT ANDaPi—PLIER INFORMATION ~o Dec. 30. 2009 10:28AM mark(1500)MEALTH INSURANCE 1 Aatve For ADVAI matoneea PAVERTS RECOUNT NO,921OS4a2. SEMACE fa*gIATY COBATIONANCED, PAIN. No. 4873 Pp. 8LOWESTAR RRTDGE Frown i7301 RR 620 NORWH SULYH 1655-334 &ADSTIN, TR VOV26 ie Enersrcr Terie era ae| escorts 29]BL eavinnis ess ISUTITO'S HARE (Cost Mame, Sire ne,TAYTOR, CURTSTINAi Pa (Re., Bivaetyeee | Se | Seouse| ~Pema[ 7] overf] & SO0_ RANCH RORD 620 MN #422 0IOMDAR PARTIC | £Pin oes, Skea7-1062 . 3Uptsure, ecidso tna ~|EaTORI a RRGREBS 7 #9. QTMER or gpa sr “Tsa a ene nt ner aten teen)soy serrate _ orien ane ieee Ga PAGEANT NRE =pele DONESVAR BREDGE tC =Na. TESER [ale Cae &&aaR 3024587 .i5=&§in ce 5-f eefw. &te 4Ig| we I i -! aimauseo beallt faicadl : SRV ARE NORTH TAR MD, ABVANGED PF oaTER BLVD, STR POP PO ROX 2i OKLABOMA TY OK 73..2¢-uo3a —*2407057250 TASPROVES GMS TESS C809 PSPUT CMT 1 GOS COR,Sh. Suave 127 39H 099HUGE MAGN Manual avaliaote Ri GMAT INICOOTeD 0406No. 4873 PogLONESUAR BRIOGIS FUNDOo 7307 RR 6G2O NORVH SULrE 1655-3346C1iso0) 201 aR 6 orHEALTH INSURANCE (01. AiRG FOpEtae AUSTIN, ''X 73726Dec. 30. 2609 10:29AM mark malone (or Bragraua ty bornoutst [Vol iaiR Ss Le Noraubit(is bane ALB3SOL62 .SO INSUINGD'S HARE (ast Raron Phat Name, Minto GiniSiy YLOR, CURESTINA7. INMURGE'S KOONEES (Mo. Street)BGOO RANCH ROAD 620 N #422 |eT SFR awBE wine t i 2 yop pege HyeBET omef HERRBE- BRB a rricnac unmet Eniiane? t512 Joay-1 0623Bisstont 1 carla riesroe ARTE PICT GAAP GR TERM Be. PMELOVIUM ES (Cineoat os Pee[Udves Be jeePLAGE (State)SHA OR SaiaOT RATE |LikAND INSURED INFORRAS I CO S001) FE TRIS [ese TeaorerLim) Net) ozz024ae7 7 On A1TER Grime” EN= | S1> TRAGROSIS OF RTI, HieiRGS BEATS Vw172s42000 aHENDEAIISPua perk eareey aie: Met OY BR OF SUPPLIES IRFORRATION -— ¥) PHYSIC eee ncbenee eneA rer2s, eboenat TAX Lo. Mums” aeons” |eas °ALU MORSE Bch ae zS12 oo 2“~MARK f MALODE, wo, ADVANCED Pisre 20% SO Hox 2eae3aOKLAROMA CTTY OK 7326-98Taso7os7zzso fe -APSERSUEIS OMS GSE OND PORT CHS TAO COND)D 0407 va¢. 30. 2009 10:29AM mark malone No. 4873 PodTONES TAR BRTOOR FOND730 RR G20 NORTH SULTR 1655-344RUSTTM, TK 70726—> SARE9ATFENT AND INSURED PORATION ee TR TAYLOR, CHRTSTTWAa HSDAESS ABDREEA Gio, AacapRANCH ROAD G20 N AY LOR, CHRISTPATIENTS ADOARES Ghaaa . SieoalyARS ROAD PARK gg 1b. EMPLOYEA'S HAME OF SCHOOL MAME ULNGE BLAN MAKE On Hamar Nabe(ives: Be] xe LONESTAR BREOGHSERVED POA COBAL Gg OF jf TE THERE ANGTHE ©. OULER DYERS NAME OF SCHOO, NAKE ea Fi SUPERRIGE PUAN NATE ORT BIG OAC ARIE SICHEO apes SEEG ATURE ONE af ton 20. OLY SIO PA, BIAGNOSIS OF MATURE GF HL | s9219tego 4a POMER MFORRATIONuta> PHYSIGIAN OF St MR, ADVANGRDhY OK 73126--G938 ADVANCED PATN CARR NORTIE68168 AGUSTIN CENTER ATV, atm 264BUSTIN TX 7B TS?T2-3GeZOH98 [407057250 _ -_ — 2407057256 |APPROVED GMB 9638-G609 FORM Chis 1600 {ORIES)NORE SP iamcaaton MaHUGY Qvatabie Ab Senynieoere, :D 0408 iMALONE }No. 4873 PoodLOWES PAR BREDGL ue€15003 730). RR 6270 NORTH SUTYH 1655-2334HEALTH INSURANCE OANA FORM AUSTIN PK TE726AP ERONEE GY NATIONAL UMP OH CLARA COM "Dec, 30, 2009 19:29AM mark malone IIS GARE B600paCRDARwr coor 3703 PALL CEDARSanny ern NIGESE DATE OF oIRESURANSE BAN RANE OF PREGA BitLONESTAR ORTDGRves_—_be JeoSDS GH AUT HSHIZEO 7 rRonsAs OU RR RL ineaeengiDIAGNOSIS Gi wai ui Gr Leneas OF mINUETY. (Relate Hee 129 oF d—— 35qioi LSS92998" ‘ Lo fles21a ft2 Joon bine Seed Dbl _ |an Bede bb ceedfoot pe Ias. bance ascoulve no. I; 55 BRE4335921097 las eeeneen hE LOOsar REAVEE Fae TY TSCA TIN ini yen899-3323 ADVANCED BAN PATH CARE NORTHQUIN CENTER BLVD,ABYVANEIEesis12-ARRZ009 [a 407057250 | Inasovosz2se — P tSUSHI AN Ser mca on MBRGVER GMS OSG O599 PCA ChE SOD TUMOR)D 0409 de GRLANOMA GTTY OK 73126- gaze ——— PNVSICAN OR SiPPLER POATMARK T MALONE sion,HUIGG ruskeuicilony WaaDec. 30. 2009 10:30AM mark maione No. 4873 Po 12LONESTAR BRIDGE FUND“301 BR 620 NORTH suZTm 165AUSTIN, TX VA726 ar Be Sse, HTS ais DAR PBRsegof] tarseal] DAR PARK1 HECK NURABERT bos' iED INFORMATION 3c Pau OR 319: []vesmee -. BEAPLOMEEERIT? (C4&. AUTO ACCIDENT? GURANER BT AN WEST GR SHE ——— PATIENT AND mngua:SIGNATURECHASTE Fer WGAsoy o23024397... ait by Cina”8 LBS... PCOMIMES 1, et bce toYSICIAI GR SUPRLISE INFORRATON ————— _{_ PRSO Tae. ARRAS MB,OK 73126 9938 BOVANCED VAIN CAtE NOE6818 AUSTIN CentER DEVO,AGHTIN TX 78732SIGNED 127 AGRPOOS Ta 407057280 fe a oseoABETOVEN CMS OSST ESOS FORM OME THOS TOSS)NOCSC tastricton Manta: availabla ah www.cnieo.oryD 0410 {foment PEHEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORMAPPROVED BY NATIONAL UNIFORM CLAIM COMMITTEE 90/35LONESTAR 6RIDGE FUND7301 RA 620 NCRTH SUITE 1655 3AUSTIN, TX 78726ce930 90001SUB ID: 788835CPID: 4300rica [TT] MEDIAS] emtecncwie #3 | Th INSURED'S 1D. NUMBER (For Program in Wem 4)GLBS50862 ME (Laat Name, Fimst Name, WiCHRISTINA 4OINSUN=SD'S NAME (Lact Name, Fist Name, Middle jitial)TAYLOR, CHRISTINA TAYLOR,5. PATIENT'S ADORESS (No.. Stes) Te PATIENT RELATIONS HIF TO INSURED 7. INSURED'S ADDRESS (No.. Suset) _8600 RANCH ROAD 620 N Gil sot [%] spousef_jonia[] omef] | 8600 RANCH ROAD 620 N 411city, ne - STATE [ o. PATIENT STATUS ory STATEAUSTIN Tx singe [] wamec{"] omer [X] | AUSTIN ™Zip COBE TELEPHONE (include Aien Godsy ZIP SOF FELEPHONE (india Aron Codey78726 ( y employes [Z] Eulstime 78726 | C )TON RELATED TC: 11 INSURED S FOLIEY GAGUP GA FEGA NUMBER © OTHER INSURED'S NAME (Laci Name, Firsi Name, Midis init TSS PATIENT'S CO @ OTHER INSURED S POLICY OF GROUP NUMBER | eumchvers MPLOVER'S NAME OR SCHOOL NAMEiat et |“PX]xofolves 5S DATE OF BIRTH SEX{OR 1is7s uf]b. EMPLOYER'S NAME OF SCHOOL NAMEa INSURE,br [XJso© OTHER AGaIDENT?(Coves Dno‘© INSURANGE PLAN NAME OA PROGRAM NAMELONESTAR BRIDGE FUND &INSURANGE PLAN NAME OR PROGRAM NAME70d. RESERVED FOR LOCAL USE GS THERE ANOTHER HEACTIT BENEFIT PLANTCodves [2X ]no ayes, return to and comptete tem 9 es BEAD SACK OF FORT BEFORE COMPLETING & SIGNING TiS FORM,42, PATIENT'S OR AUTHORIZED PERSON'S SIGNATURE |auttorze the rolease of any medical or other Informabon necessaylo process this claim. also request payment of government benolite either to mysell or fo the parly whe accepts assignmentSINSURED'S OR AUTHORIZED PERSON'S SIGNATURE | auinorizePayment of medical benefits to the undersigned physician oF supplier forBenwices described belaw. (TS. RESERVED FOR LOCAL USE telovnsiano SEGNATURE ON FILE _ __ pare O571172009 signe SIGNATURE ON FILEaT EEE g FOE ERST Ea. Sune | EB a A ESS HBAS EATEN Bune WORT IN CURRENT GHDUPATIO| iF NAME OF REFERRING PR raph FP VULsS ie soo GRE TREO OATES RRLATED TO CURRENT SERVICES,CHRISTOPHER T SMITH M D Bitar O23S02G387—°°7 777 4] enom ro !oe 2G. OUTSIDE LAB? $ CHARGESLolves [X]no | { I21. DIAGNOSIS OF NATURE OF @LNEGS Gi TIOAY (sists sme, BS or Ai Wem BIE by Lived TE MEBISAID AE SUEMISBION11338 21 3 L724 2 + BSBIEND oman ner. no.° . (23. PRIOR AUTHORIZATION NUMBER2 (723 2 aL—, DATES) OF SERVICE G. BAGCEDUAES, SEAVIGES, OF SUPPLIES 1 re - a, B Tfrom | Ceaptain Urouel Circorhesta lomeniosts y Be bee] oc. RENDERINGsa 0O" vy am 88 ve ema | ceteiSeevens umecoren i wenten | scHances Bis TEP] our. PROVIDER IDLEDNPEET S3104630941 O5}211}09)05'11; 69; 11]{ |[g9213 | t ! i ji23 |] 15200[ L{N] nei | TéES9S99871 —2 Popo pp yp a | | ho [fae ponoco a i Let Lo faa doco c sssi Lg 1 bo pat fon1 : 1 ‘ + 1 Peo foi a a I i ! tod Loseoo: i i { : Lo {fae doco oc oct 125. FEDERAL TAX LO. NUMBER SSN EIN3310435094 CoreyBS. PATIENTS ACCOUNT RIG.5272401868 Dm, TOTAL CHARGEso 15200 j « BT. SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN OR SUPPLIERINCLUDING DEGREES OR CREDENTIALS(loertity that ino statements on the revereApply 10 this bill and are made @-part termat)MARK T MALONESIGNED: o5721789 DATEROUND 3, SERVICE FACILITY LOCATION INFORMATIONADVANCED PAIN CARE ROUND R2@00 S MAYS ST STE 205ROCK TTX 78664-758033. BILLING PROVIDER INFO & PH e 6MARK T MALONE, DsPO BOX 268938OKLAHOMA CiTY OK 73126+8938ADVANCED P = F407057250— = 140705725 0p G2351043094 NUGC Instruction Manual avaliable ab www.nucc-orgAPPROVED OME-0935-0900 FORM GMS-1500 (0808)D O411No. 4873 P14LONESBAR BRLDGE FUND7301 RR 620 NORTH SUTTR 1659-434AUSTIN, YX 73726Bec. 30. 2009 10:31AM mark malone[1500 }HEALTH IMs “CARRIER omen“RES te f Jems aroo =) J sour a | | eatin Boo | WAYLON,TNSORECE A ed Bex —ben OWES: ARIE OR ROHOON SARE INSURED FORINT —————- AT A© INSUA TANCE PION FAME ON PHOMHAN HARELONESYAR BRE OGIE FUNDWhe AVOTIEN CALI GEACRT PLANTeh Lhe _K Ine.FAVED POR TOGAL USE RUAN fenizen desenvsSTGNATURE ON FTEDURARCE |p WOT WY CUTstaneo ro. :SGTARGES SUITH CHRTSTOTHER T1D HESERVED ROFL CGAL USE|. DIAGNOSIS OCHA LUNE OF ILLNESS Or aDIRGIRIOSTS OH HALLE OMIGINAL FEE Ato. 23. HOM AU TROnIZA TOR NOMRER 6 “an sonances oth| iz | isz.go [| 1 f net #5930907 e! 4 l i ! {__ fee Po oAaa ii ! cece canbe | ! Jf sw gof ={ i - l i 4 Po fee Sa =i PoP tt es 3SI . P--4--------.- =On ve heswurwcuachena “vi acest Pt pa | cece t*GR FEDERAL TAR LO, BS. PATIENTS REGGUNT WE. PTOTAL CHAE i reson rat (30. ca j33404 3094 «gt BB8213 090 - = 482.00 [ % nJoo1%Be “Itt RE AMIGH BACALITE 1 ooaTi BRITT PREMMrA MOR PNT EIS) pogo 5.ADVANCED DAL ROUND ROCK MARK T MALONE, Mp, ADVANGED 2? IN }ZO00 5 says § ws 201 POH: 68948 . ‘ |AARK T MATONE ROUND ROGK “FX 78664" 7580 F3126-993u |i+ TAT3QGROOY a n97057250APPROVED OMB-0338-0809 FORM OMT. 1600 (G5)MStUSHON BAAUAl BVAltIS AE WwwAN NUE OryD 0412No. 4873 PL 45 Dec. 30. 2009 10:31AM mark maloneLONESTAR BREOGR FUND +C1500 3 4307 RR G20 NOR'CH SULYE 1ESS~-334 gs‘ AUSYLN, UX TRIZS cog& ye BRITE RATEO2 O04 2279 ef] RESTIANNlSUEDE ADUNEDE (No. Eveet)4600 RANCTE ROAM G20 N #477 _| SWAT ||HATION ————SURED BIFOR 2 ERIPLOVESENT? (6Calves ;cr vex geno ES2 Guen acdInoin “Tern,comer eae REA RVED FOR LOCAL UAT AE Risurance pian tante ¢“PATIENT AND 8, : 70wae EGE ATER E eomeo 7 ray GasTERARE GF REFERRING PROVINEH OF gsogza | 10019758 en La OR SUPPLIER INSORRRATION ae >| 29. renetes HO. PAUSES AEOURLY 00, ; > ie SATE PAR P= WAT aR OSPRAAS oS 4 OB BI2IENT __fgetvee f = 30260 | & o.oalF 229.60BE. BORVIGE PAGILITY LOCATION INFORMATION OS HELLIS PRROVIMER ENG bite 4 ww } B99.A oO 3i MARK MALONE, Mb, ADVANCED Be N ADVANSED DATN, CARE ROUND ROCKPO BOX 26GS38 sr ‘re 20h =oa 7BC64 “7589 | ORTATIOMA TTY OK 43126-89583- lersez7es7250 iYAP RHOVE TS OMH-0G-28 C988 FORM OMS- 1506 (69/05)D 0413Sep.15. 2009 2:46PM mark malone No, 2112 PL 6AVL DICAL, BILLING AKKIDAVITBelore me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared the custodian of billingrecords for Advance Pain Care, who, being, by me duly sworn, deposed as Fallows:2, :WO LSE RN _.. Lam of sound mind, capable of making this “My name isaffidavit.Iam the person in charge of the billing records of Advance Pain Care Attached to thisived slaterment of the service and the churge foraffidavit are billing records that provide an itemithe service that Advance Pain Care provided to ron or about July 30, 2009. Theattached billing records are a part of this affidavit.The attached records are kept by me in the regular course of business,contained in the records was transmitted to me in the regular coursc of busincss by Advanec PairCare or an cmployec or representative of Advances Pain Care who had personal knowledge of theinformation, ‘The records were mace al or near the Gme or reasonably soon after the lime Chat theservice wus provided. The records are the original and an exact duplicate of the original.The service provided wus necessary and the amount charged for the service wasreasonable at the time and place that the service was provided.Ler hCa ACUSTODIAN OF BILLING RECORDS xistina 1 The information GE 005.SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on the JS day ofMY COMMISSION EXPIRES Notary Public, State of ‘TexasDoho rat FossePrinted NameMy commission expires: 3/le f 4‘Maroty 6, 2017 D 0414Pp. 16 Dec. 30. 2009 10:32AM mark malone LOMESTAR BRIDGE“307 RR 620 NORTH SULtH 1655-334AUSTLN, LX 78726 Ab UBIO CLAIR CORBI APPROVED THY RASa RR asia Toe OT BES oS| J#@LBS50862ata eran TaCaerWAYLOR, QURTSTTNAnO CARRIER 401 TAT, CEDARS ROAD a B6OO RANGA ROAD S20 N #415cry ° a Laren | Mee iPORE OID PAL jee sHORT Wace Aiek SSa0) 2L* n12 Wa7-2LoOS62 =SAPs i - betteledtes 23=B2PLAGE (oe 3=ae 8 INSUN,TONRSTAR BRID : ca cerned BE Jeo= CACORE ACCA ~~oe fT ]yes kTTea. RESERVES FORT AGAT pate,__07_ 39 2009.mcg wee Am ETSWORK IN CURRENT OGomA30 a nT OF | mm BATTEN ODIEeHP2928 1st go wtf| I i Bo PHYSICIAN OR RTL INFORRATION aae ) = weOKbvaARCE 38 Srawier PACITY LOGATION hiraneE ADVANCED PAIN2000 S Mays sw SYE BBYPAM TET. FREDERICK BOUND ROCK UX FEG64.-75A9STA OTOR TAROMOO. uexoIoioe—— 4107057250eee eee ee APPROVED OMe-0590-0500 FORM SMS 1500 O05) Bence,NGGG fisivaction Manual avaiiniie at! Sieur D 0415Sep.15. 2009 2:47PM mark malone Ne. 2112 Pp. 8 Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appearcd the custodian of billingrecords for Advanced Care, who, being by me duly sworn, deposed as follows:“My name is LOSS. Veo. Tam of sound mind, capable of making thisaffidavit.dain the person in charge of the billing records of Advenced Pain Care Attached to thisaffidavit arc billing rccords that provide an itemized statement of the service and the charge forthe service that Acivanced Pain Care provided to Christina ‘aylor on or about August 13, 2009.The attached billing records are a part of this affidavit.The attached records are kept by me in the regular course of business.contained in the records was transmitted to me in the regular course of business by AdvancedPain Care or an employee or representative of Advanced Pain Care who had personal knowledgeof the information. “Vhe rccords were made at or near the time or reasonably soon after the timethat the service was provided, The records are the original and an exact duplicate of the original.necessary and the amount chargcd for the service was ‘The informationThe service provided wasreasonable at the time and place that the service was provided.borer KoadCUSTODLAN Ol BILLING RECORDSSWORN TO ANP SURSCRIBED belore me on the LS day of soot 2009. DEBORAH MAY FOSTERMY COMMISSION EXPIRES { ‘March 6, 2071 Printed NameMy commission expires: Boll LOKD 0416No. 4673 P. 182:32AM mark malonsLONESTAR TRTNGR FUND“301 RE 620 NORTH SUTTR V6hh-334AUSTIN, TX VRV2E RaDec. 36. 2009 tonysone ernannmennementti: gg eran cman rte ae deeSieiap ta WRAPONR TE Rie iia vaere in enue fs vAYELY LOR, CURTSRO PATIENTS. 8600 RANCH ROAD 620 N #417ey eeCkDAR PARK 'iTON oo Oa~ PATIENT AND INSURED INFORMAT DAR BARC ope:OUE | RecERGnnevis Ave Cou) lone Creutz rors wf}RARMOGR BGTOOL Hatasfs REAL MEN TY (C8[Jves sore aceinesirs PLAGE (attsives Yee. ETT OLNER AGEIDENT? acumQqpomarighENT gErWicey ATION FATES pysts Ww34, HAI OF TIEFERRING PROVINER on ct He SOLACETH CHRIS Torin tems FL orl te Men BAK Gy OhLAR. ASE PHYSICIAN OR SUPPLIER INFORMATION a ccs = [aa atten etn A$2000 28 | kOe 00seas Hoenu 725. site asa PROUSER MIPS BITS Cb Fase MARK F MALONE, Mb, AbVAnCED BF >BOUND ROCKSie Bey PO ORGM 26 85664-7580 | ORLASOMA CITY OK 73126-8938 One MAY _ Re OND Rees(gone, 2008 th OVOSI2 BE et g9798 7250 PF ¥NGG ination Manual RG YON NUES Org, APPREIVED OMB -S8G4-GOG0 LOAM CHG €S00 LO5/0S} [D 0419!On rAON a ca80 00001_. LONESTAR BRIDGE FUND SUB ID: 7888351500 7301 RR 620 NORTH SUITE 1655 3 cPID: 4300HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORM AUSTIN, TX 78726APPROVED BY NATIONAL UNIFORM CLAIM COMMITTEE 08/05crpyreca pica [TTCHAMP WA Ta, INSURED S 10. NUMBER (For Program in trem 2)4183508627 = MEDICAIG SRIGARE.MEDICAR: So4. INSURED'S NAME Cast Nama, First Name, Miata~¢- CARRIER» Gaadicara 2) | (adtonts 9 {] Sponsors san) [_] (ornber 104)a CHRISTINA 2, PATIENTS NAME (Last Name, First Name, Middle Initial)TAYLOR, CHRISTINA ! TAYLOR,= ERTERTS RODRIG Wo SSS es Rxveker RECTORS Te RRS 7 INGUREDS REGRESS Soa8600 RANCH ROAD 620 N GIL seu[X] spousef J cria[_] other[ 7 B60G RANCH ROAD 620 N Gila arate fa paren Sra — STATEAUSTIN TX siesto[_] martes{] omer [X] | AUSTIN TXSoe FOr ETOR ance ava lny ae eed “FECEPHORE TaSTe KS Sash78726 cy empoves [—] SMS0a° (7) Sense 78726 Cc)1G PAHENTS CONSITION HELMED TOI 7 REUREOS BOLE EGUSON ica AUER 8, GTHER INSURED 'S NAME (Last Namo, First Name, Middle Initial)2. EMPLOYMENT? (Current or Previous) @ GTHER INSURED POLICY OF GROUP NUMBERClves = [X]nob. AUTO ACCIDENT? QIER GUNES PATE OF CATH© BEER BECO EP >py bow efPLACE (State) a IRSUREDS DATE OF IRING21 0%, 1879 u[—]5. EMPLOYER'S NAME OR SCHOOL NAME°CY (C]ves[Inocommen abzioenre © EMPLOVER'S NAME OR SCHOOL NAMECves — [X]no70d. RESERVED FOR LOGAL USE©. INSURANGE PLAN NAME OR PROGRAM NAMELONESTAR BRIDGE FUND@. 1S THERE ANOTHER HEALTH BENEFIT PLANT @. INSURANCE PLAN NAME OR PROGRAM NAME Loves [X]so _tryes,ratuen to and compiete tom 9 aaURED'S OR AUTHORIZED PERSON'S SIGNATURE I authonzePayment of macical bonellis to tha undersigned prycieen oF eeehes tor 7, below. EAD BACK OF FOAM GEFORE COMPLETING & SIGNING THIS FORK,42, PATIENT'S OR AUTHORIZED PERSON'S SIGNATURE | authedre ihm foloase Of any Medical or other information necessaryto pracess this claim. | also request payment af goverament benefits eltrier to mysell or bs ihe party who aosepin assioneeentcare OF9 2572009Seevices described below.sicnen SIGNATURE ON FILE| ~4—~~— PATIENT AND INSURED INFORMATION __ sioneo SIGNATURE ON FILE 1s17. RATE OBGURRENy: 4 = Ba OF17. NAME OF REFERRING PROV SER OR OIMES SGuncECHRISTOPHER YT SMITH M D18. RESEAVED FOR LOCAL USE ~ EPSTENT HAS DAG SANE QR SIMiLQR ICLNESS.GIVE FIRST DATE RA1S DATES EATEN ERNABLELO WORK OY ENT Bryer ODwe } O i t FROM iFT 7 TA < SiTr g _Fv7ol oi wo a | 1 HOSPTIGYZATIBY OATES RELATED FO SORBENT SERVICER1| LOS23026387 FROM t t TO t '~ 20. OUTSIDE LAB? ‘ CHARGES L]yes [X]no_| I “3 oF 4 to tam S48 by Lina) +Be. jemiBSBIEAIP RESUPMISSION Oh iinAL REF. NO. St. SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN OF SUPPLIERINCLUDING DEGREES OR CREDENTIALS(cenity that the statements on the reverse ADVANCED PAIN CARE ROUND R2000 S MAYS ST STE 2012i_ DIAGNOSIS OR NATURE OF ILUNESS Of INJURY (Hotate Roms 7, 2.2 (24 2 |2B. PRIGR AUTHORIZATION NUMBER21719 46 41338 21ae AL DATE(S) OF SERVICE 1B co D. PROCEDURES, SERVICES. OR SUPPLIES | = F Ss #. © aFrom To leace oF| (Explain Unusual Cireurnstances) I pIAGNosis: one fe3s| 6 RENDERINGwm 05" yy MM oo ow jew] ema | cevneeos pe MODIFIER eSinrer 8 CHARGES Sits | ua. PROVIDER ID. 2Ss ' ; . N[ eT) S3s10asa0q99:24} 09/09} 24/09; 11] lgg2i4 | t ‘ i L1e236] 23do0o0|] 2[ Nine | 11646461496pod op bp a bof ob bs | Lo pe pon r teet } i f i { | [ ! : ! I | |e fp _i L ! i i | 1 L Loot i ii f id {fae ooi ot | | i | I i : : ' f boy Lae {ooo ctrPot op t
Case Info
Case No.
(Subscribe to View)
Document Filed Date
September 30, 2010
Case Filing Date
September 09, 2009
County
Category
PERSONAL INJURY VEHICLE (GEN LIT )
Status
CLOSED
Parties
CHARLES CASSANDRA FOXAttorney for the Plaintiff
CHRISTENSEN , DANIEL JOther
CHRISTENSEN DANIEL JOHNAttorney for the Plaintiff
CHRISTENSEN , LISAOther
COURVILLE CRAIG ANTHONYAttorney for the Defendant
CREWS JOE K.Attorney
HELPNET LCOther
MAYA , JORGE ARROYODefendant
MEDSTAR FUNDING III LPOther
MEDSTAR FUNDING II LPOther
MEDSTAR FUNDING I LPOther
MEDSTAR GP III INCOther
MEDSTAR GP II INCOther
MEDSTAR GP I INCOther
SHANROCK HOLDINGS INCDefendant
SIMS DOROTHY CLAYAttorney for the Plaintiff
SMITH EDWARD MASONAttorney
TAYLOR , CHRISTINAPlaintiff
TAYLOR , KENNETHPlaintiff
Brantley PringleAttorneys for Defendants
Jason DowAttorneys for Plaintiffs
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Sep 03, 2024 |53RD, DISTRICT COURT |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |D-1-GN-24-005677
Case
JUSTIN WILLIAMS VS. MARC WESTERN
Sep 06, 2024 |250TH, DISTRICT COURT |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |D-1-GN-24-005887
Case
SHYAM TAMANG,DEVI TAMANG VS. AMANDA ROBINSON
Sep 05, 2024 |98TH, DISTRICT COURT |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |D-1-GN-24-005859
Case
ERIC VIELMA vs. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.,JOHN DOE #1,JOHN DOE #2
Sep 04, 2024 |261ST, DISTRICT COURT |Premises |D-1-GN-24-005756
Ruling
GONZALES vs CORONA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Sep 04, 2024 |CVRI2304664
DEMURRER ON 1ST AMENDEDCOMPLAINT FOR OTHERGONZALES VS CORONA PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTYCVRI2304664 REGIONAL MEDICAL DAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORTCENTER (OVER $25,000) OF CORINNEGONZALES BY AIMEE NICOLEFRENCH, MDRuling:The hearing on the demurrer, currently set for September 4, 2024, is vacated. If the defendantstill wishes to challenge the plaintiff’s pleading, the defendant shall fully comply with Code of CivilProcedure section 430.41 by, inter alia, meeting and conferring with plaintiff’s counsel, either inperson, by telephone, or by videoconference, concerning the sufficiency of that pleading. If theplaintiff does not agree to amend, the defendant shall file and serve either an answer or a newdemurrer no later than September 30, 2024. If the defendant fails to file and serve eitherresponsive pleading by that date, the plaintiff shall request entry of default within 10 daysthereafter.Analysis:“Before filing a demurrer . . . the demurring party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone,or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for thepurpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objectionsto be raised in the demurrer. If an amended complaint . . . is filed, the responding party shall meetand confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before filing a demurrer to theamended pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a), emphasis added.)Despite the express statutory requirement to meet and confer regarding the FAC, nothing in thedeclaration of Hummasti describes any attempt to meet and confer after the FAC was served.Perhaps the defendant thought that, in light of the ruling on the demurrer to the original complaint,no conference would result in any agreement to amend further. However, the statutory obligationto confer after an amendment is not conditioned on an anticipated likelihood of success. Even ifthe defendant believes the effort is futile, the defendant is required to try.
Ruling
JACK MELKONIAN VS EDWARD PASCO, ET AL.
Sep 06, 2024 |21STCV24930
Case Number: 21STCV24930 Hearing Date: September 6, 2024 Dept: T Motion to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted Moving Party: Plaintiff Jack Melkonian Responding Party: Defendant Management Towing, Inc. Tentative Ruling: Grant in part BACKGROUND This is a personal injury case arising out of a collision on July 11, 2019. This case has been pending since 2021. Plaintiff served Defendant Management Towing Inc. dba Rowlett Towing (Defendant) Requests for Admission on October 20, 2023. Plaintiff has yet to receive responses. MOVING PARTY POSITION Plaintiff argues the Court should Deem Request for Admissions Admitted because Plaintiff has received no response to these Requests for Admission to date from either Defendant or Pasco, and that Defendants failure to respond to Plaintiffs correspondences constitute a misuse of the discovery process. Based on a $300.00 hourly rate, Plaintiff requests $3,133.75 in sanctions relating to this motion, including ten hours of work ($3,000.00) in addition to $133.75 in additional fees. OPPOSITION Defendant argues the Motion must be denied because it has fatal defects and verified and Code-compliant responses will have been served by the time of the hearing on this motion. Moreover, Defendant argues it provided an explanation of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect resulting in the failure to serve a timely response. REPLY Plaintiff argues Defendants opposition admits they were served with requests for admission while represented by WOLFE & WYMAN LLP and that no sufficient excuse for Defendants failure to respond has been proffered. ANALYSIS I. Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted Where there has been no timely response to a request for admission under CCP § 2033.010, the propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction. (CCP § 2033.280(b).) CCP § 2033.280(c) states, in relevant part: The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. If a party to whom requests for production of documents were directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (CCP § 2031.300(b)-(c).) CCP § 2031.300 contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served. The propounding party need not demonstrate good cause or satisfy a meet-and-confer requirement all that needs to be shown in the moving papers is that a set of requests for production of documents was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403-04. Here, Defendant Management Towing Inc. dba Rowlett Towing (Defendant) fails to provide an adequate explanation for its delay in providing responses to Plaintiff. Defendant asserts that its former counsel Wolfe & Wyman LLP had filed a successful Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel as to Pasco in October 2023 and that Defendants new counsel first noticed the overdue discovery request with Plaintiffs filing of this motion. Merely changing counsel is not sufficient explanation as to why Defendants counselboth former and currentfailed to respond to Plaintiffs requests. Thus, provided Defendant does not submit responses by the date this motion is heard, the Court will grant Plaintiffs request to deem requests for admission as admitted. The Court declines to grant Plaintiffs motion with respect to Defendant Pasco, as Plaintiff has not provided the Court with the Requests for Admissions. II. Sanctions Based on a $300.00 hourly rate, Plaintiff requests $3,133.75 in sanctions relating to this motion, including ten hours of work ($3,000.00) in addition to $133.75 in additional fees. The Court finds Plaintiffs hourly rate reasonable, whereas the number of hours worked is not as this is not a complicated motion. The Court finds it reasonable to reduce the number of hours to 3.5. Accordingly, sanctions in the amount of $1,050, plus a filing fee of $60, are awarded. RULING Plaintiffs motion to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted is GRANTED with respect to Defendant Management Towing Inc. dba Rowlett Towing. Plaintiffs request for sanctions against Defendant is GRANTED in the amount of $1,110. Sanctions to be paid within 30 days of Plaintiff giving notice of this ruling. Plaintiffs motion to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted with respect to Defendant Pasco is DENIED.
Ruling
Mook, et al. vs. Jeantette
Sep 03, 2024 |22CV-0200414
MOOK, ET AL. VS. JEANTETTECase Number: 22CV-0200414This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. An order to Show Cause issued on August 21,2024 and is scheduled for hearing on September 23, 2024. To avoid duplicative appearances, today’s hearing iscontinued to Monday, September 23, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63. No appearance is necessary ontoday’s calendar.
Ruling
ANGELA TAYLOR VS MOTHERS IN ACTION, INC., ET AL.
Sep 04, 2024 |24STCV10857
Case Number: 24STCV10857 Hearing Date: September 4, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 78 ¿ ANGELA TAYLOR, Plaintiff(s), vs. MOTHERS IN ACTION, INC., et al., Defendant(s). Case No.: 24STCV10857 Hearing Date: September 4, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Angela Taylor (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Mothers In Action, Inc. (MIA), Taste of Soul Festival, and Does 1 to 50 for damages arising from a trip and fall on October 15, 2022 at 3650 W Martin Luther King Jr Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 90008. Plaintiff alleges she was walking on the premises when her foot became tangled on exposed wires that were connected to the stage at the Taste of Soul Festival hosted by Mothers In Action, Inc., which caused her to fall. (Compl. p. 5.) The complaint sets forth two causes of action for general negligence and premises liability. MIA now demurs to the complaint on the grounds that each cause of action fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against it. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and MIA filed a reply. II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.¿ (CCP § 430.41(a).)¿¿¿ The Court finds MIA has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer. (Decl. Channing, ¶¶ 2-3.) III. LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.¿ It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).¿(CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id. at 994.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)¿No other extrinsic evidence can be considered.¿(Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Firemans Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].) IV. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE MIA requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) Plaintiffs complaint, (2) Taste of Souls Website, (3) MIAs Secretary of State Statement of Information, (4) MIAs Restated Articles of Incorporation, (5) The City of Los Angeles Street Closure Permit, (6) Petition Late Claim in Case No. 23STCP04102, (7) Los Angeles County Metro Transit Authoritys (LACMTA) Opposition to Late Petition in in Case No. 23STCP04102, (8) Minute Order Re: Ruling on Petition in Case No. 23STCP04102, (9) Meet and Confer email exchange. Except for Request 1, Plaintiff objects to the remainder of MIAs requests. Requests 1 and 6 are granted. (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d).) Requests 2, 5, and 9 are denied as not being subject to judicial notice. Requests 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are denied due to its lack of relevance. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 296, 301 [Judicial notice is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.].) V. DISCUSSION MIA argues that the loss location was owned by LACMTA and that the location was under construction at the time of injury. MIA contends Plaintiff submitted a claim to LACMTA, and therefore Plaintiff cannot allege that MIA owned or controlled the property. MIAs argument that this is a sham pleading because Plaintiff made a government tort claim to LACMTA in a separate case is not particularly relevant. (See Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 666, 690 [Generally, complainants may plead, in the alternative, inconsistent facts or theories.].) MIA relies on Cantu v. Resol. Tr. Corp. (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 857, which is illustrative of how the rule against sham pleading can reach complaints filed in different cases. In Cantu, there had been a dispute over certain funds held in a bank account. (Id. at 870-871.) The bank had filed an interpleader action against Mr. Cantu and several persons who had contacted it regarding the account. (Id. at 871.) Mr. Cantu filed pleadings in that case which contained extensive arguments in an attempt to negate the claims made by one of the other parties to the dispute. (Id. at 871-872.) After the interpleader action settled (without Mr. Cantus participation) and was dismissed, Mr. Cantu filed a lawsuit against the bank and its lawyers for malicious prosecution, on the grounds that there actually were no competing claims to the funds, and therefore there was no need for an interpleader. (Id. at 869-870, 872, 877.) The Court of Appeal found this claim barred by the doctrine of sham pleading. The panel held that Mr. Cantu could not have participated in the interpleader action, and filed pleadings disputing the various claims on their merits, without knowing that there were competing claims to dispute. (Id. at 878-879.) There is no doubt that Cantu filed this action with full knowledge that competing claims for control of the Nosotros accounts existed at the time [the bank] filed the interpleader action&Cantu asserted [in the interpleader action], and therefore conceded [in this action], that Mr. Zamora, a named claimant in the interpleader action and the former president of Nosotros, claimed a right to control the Nosotros accounts separate and apart from, and in contrast to the claims of Nosotros and its officers& it is clear that the [banks lawyers] had identified at least one party who asserted a claim to control of the Nosotros accounts other than Nosotros itself and Mr. Cantu. Cantu's attempt to escape and plead around the import of his own admissions is transparent. (Ibid.) Applying the analysis and rule of Cantu to this case is problematic. The sham pleading doctrine is intended to enable courts to prevent an abuse of process. (Amid v. Hawthorne Community Medical Group, Inc. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1390-1391.) The main premise of the rule against sham pleading is that a party which contradicts itself is probably engaging in outright deception. It is not necessarily contradictory for Plaintiff to plead that more than one party owned, controlled, or maintained the subject premises, such that this complaint against MIA would be considered an inconsistent allegation. Further, the Court will not consider MIAs arguments that it does not own or is not responsible for the subject location of the trip and fall. The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not the truthfulness of the allegations, and the facts as pled are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994; see also Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1144 [[D]efendants cannot set forth allegations of fact in their demurrers which, if true, would defeat plaintiff's complaint.].) It is sufficient that Plaintiffs form complaint alleges that she tripped and fell on exposed wires at 3650 W Martin Luther King Jr Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 90008, and that All Defendants negligently owned, maintained, managed, and operated the premises. (Compl. p. 5; Prem. L-2). VI. CONCLUSION MIAs demurrer to the complaint is OVERRULED. Moving Party is ordered to give notice. DATED: September 3, 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.
Ruling
MARIO HERNANDEZ GOMEZ VS BELMONT ENTERPRISES, LLC, ET AL.
Sep 04, 2024 |22STCV33817
Case Number: 22STCV33817 Hearing Date: September 4, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving and opposition papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff Mario Hernandez Gomez (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Belmont Enterprises, LLC (Belmont), The Saint Agnes Hotel, LLC (Hotel), and Does 1-30 for general negligence and premises liability. On January 9, 2023, Belmont filed an answer. On February 24, 2023, the Court dismissed Hotel without prejudice at Plaintiffs request. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. The motion was set for hearing on July 24, 2024. On July 11, 2024, Belmont filed an opposition. The Court continued the hearing to September 4, 2024. Trial is currently set for October 4, 2024. PARTIES REQUESTS Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to file a first amended complaint. Belmont asks the Court to deny the motion. LEGAL STANDARD The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 576; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324.) While a motion to permit an amendment to a pleading to be filed is one addressed to the discretion of the court, the exercise of this discretion must be sound and reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. [Citations.] And it is a rare case in which a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case. [Citations.] If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] (Redevelopment Agency v. Herrold (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1031, quoting Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) [I]t is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment. (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 (Kittredge).) Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 6:656, p. 6-193 (Cal. Practice Guide).) Ordinarily, the judge will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. . . . After leave to amend is granted, the opposing party will have the opportunity to attack the validity of the amended pleading. (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 6:644, pp. 6-189 to 6-190.) DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs complaint The complaint alleges the following: On July 10, 2022, at 560 Gladys Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90013, Defendants negligence caused a dangerous condition which created a substantial and reasonably foreseeable risk of the types of injuries suffered by Plaintiff when the premises were used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that they would be used. On the date and at the place above, Plaintiff was lawfully on the premises when, as a proximate result of the dangerous condition and the negligence of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff was punctured by a nail, causing injuries and damages to Plaintiff. B. Plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint Plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint that changes the date of the incident from July 10, 2022 to June 12, 2022. Plaintiff asserts that the request is based on information he obtained after filing the original complaint and that amendment of the complaint will not prejudice Defendants. Belmont opposes the motion, arguing the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions bars the amendment because the amended complaint would not relate back to the original complaint. An amended complaint filed after the statute of limitations has run that alleges new causes of action relates back to the original complaint if it (1) is based on the same general set of facts as those in the original complaint, (2) seeks recovery against the same defendants for the same injuries alleged in the original complaint, and (3) refers to the same incident alleged in the original complaint i.e., the same accident caused by the same offending instrumentality. (K. Banke & J. Segal, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, Statutes of Limitations (Rutter 2024) ¶ 8:160, p. 21.) In general, courts liberally apply the relation-back doctrine. (Ibid.) In determining whether an amended complaint alleges facts sufficiently similar to those in the original complaint, the critical issue is whether the original complaint gives defendant adequate notice of plaintiffs claims. (Id., ¶ 8:161, p. 22.) For purposes of Plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint, the Court finds that an amended complaint which changes only the date of the incident from July 10, 2022 to June 12, 2022 relates back to the original complaint. Belmont may, however, challenge the amended complaint based on the statute of limitations without seeking reconsideration of this finding. The Court grants Plaintiffs motion for leave to file an amended complaint. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Mario Hernandez Gomezs motion to file a first amended complaint. Plaintiff Mario Hernandez Gomez is ordered to file and serve a first amended complaint within 10 days of the hearing on this motion. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.
Ruling
MANTIZIAN vs OMNI RANCHO LAS PALMAS, LLC.
Sep 04, 2024 |CVPS2204249
Motion to Strike Complaint on Complaint forOther Personal Injury/PropertyMANTIZIAN vs OMNI RANCHO Damage/Wrongful Death Tort (OverCVPS2204249LAS PALMAS, LLC. $25,000) of NELLY MANTIZIAN by OMNIRANCHO LAS PALMAS, LLC., OMNIHOTEL MANAGEMENT CORP.Tentative Ruling: Moot in light of the Court’s ruling on the demurrer and motion for judgment on thepleadings set for hearing concurrently with this matter.
Ruling
POLANCO vs DUNLAP
Sep 05, 2024 |CVRI2304686
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE ONCOMPLAINT FOR AUTO (OVERCVRI2304686 POLANCO VS DUNLAP$25,000) OF NOE POLANCO BYJORDAN DANZIETentative Ruling: Grant motion.1Problematically, some of Dr. Kurdi’s undisputed material facts are actually merely witness perceptions asopposed to being material facts. (UMF Nos. 30, 31, 35.)4.COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE VSCVRI2404021 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONBETANCOURTTentative Ruling: No tentative ruling will be given.
Ruling
JAMES SOLEIMANI, ET AL. VS SAINT FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL OF LA CANADA-FLINTRIDGE, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT RELIGIOUS CORPORATION, ET AL.
Sep 06, 2024 |23GDCV02180
Case Number: 23GDCV02180 Hearing Date: September 6, 2024 Dept: D TENATIVE RULING Calendar: 6 Date: 9/6/2024 Case No: 23 GDCV02180 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Soleimani, et al. v. Saint Francis High School of La Canada-Flintridge, et al. DEMURRER Moving Party: Defendants Saint Francis High School of LaCanada-Flintridge, Antonio Marti, Thomas Moran and John Jordan Responding Party: Plaintiff James Soleimani RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to First Amended Complaint CAUSES OF ACTION: from First Amended Complaint 1) Negligence v. All Defendants Other than Aidan 2) NIED v. All Defendants Other than Aidan 3) IIED v. Defendant Aidan 4) Battery v. Defendant Aidan SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff James Soleimani, who originally appeared in this action as a minor appearing through his GAL, Marta Recasens, evidently is no longer a minor and is appearing on his own behalf. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff enrolled at defendant Saint Francis High School of La Canada Flintridge (SFHS) in August of 2020, and that it was important to plaintiff and his family that plaintiff attend a Roman Catholic high school for various strongly held personal reasons. Plaintiff alleges that he was particularly interested in playing organized football with the SFHS teams that participate in defendant California Interscholastic Federation (CIF) organized games against other CIF teams in the Southern California section of CIF. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, from early 2020 through May 2021, SFHS had no in-person instruction, and no active football program. In June of 2021, plaintiff began attending SFHSs football camp, and won a place on the Junior Varsity team. Plaintiff alleges that in August of 2021, plaintiff suffered an injury to his shoulder during football practice and was in October 2021 evaluated by a doctor and also diagnosed with a tear in the tendon of a finger and prescribed no PE or sports for two weeks. In October of 2021, plaintiff alleges that during the first half of a SFHS football game, plaintiff was on the sidelines due to his medical restrictions, wearing his football uniform but not wearing pads or a helmet, when defendant Aidan Austin (Aidan), a fellow student, while wearing his football helmet, aggressively accosted plaintiff verbally for not being tough enough to play through injuries. Plaintiff alleges despite Aidans continual harassment, plaintiff did not engage in any physical retaliation against Aidan, but Aidan, with his helmet still on, butted plaintiff (who was not wearing a helmet) in the face repeatedly, injuring plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges he did not fight back or do anything other than attempt to shield himself from Aidans criminal battery. Plaintiff alleges that no defendant took any significant disciplinary action against Aidan for the helmet assault, although it occurred in open view of hundreds of people, including one or more of the other defendants. At halftime, Aidan, obviously undeterred by any defendants, hunted plaintiff down in the weight room and, unprovoked, put plaintiff in a choke hold and beat him repeatedly over the head. Plaintiff alleges that the following day, upon receiving reports of Aidans unprovoked violence against plaintiff, defendant John Jordan, Dean of Students of SFHS, punished both of them equally, by suspending them both from Fridays football game. Plaintiff alleges that in November of 2021, Aidan again aggressively hunted plaintiff down in the locker room, threatened him, and proceeded to knee plaintiff in the groin, pulled plaintiffs jacket over plaintiffs head and repeatedly struck plaintiff in the head with a closed fist. Plaintiff alleges that he did not fight back and sought only to shield himself, and the incident was videotaped and viewed by Jordan, which showed older players dancing and celebrating the assault. It also documents that plaintiff never struck back. Plaintiff alleges that again defendants responded by treating plaintiff and Aidan equally, as if both were equally culpable for Aidans unprovoked criminal attack, which defendants again did nothing to stop or prevent. The complaint alleges that in mid-October, another SFHS student reported to plaintiff that the student had seen Aidan carrying a knife on campus, and warned plaintiff to stay away from Aidan because he was armed. In the latter half of October, when plaintiff was intimidated and fearful of a knife armed Aidan again attacking him, plaintiff had a video displayed SnapChat conversation with another SFHS student, in which the other student viewed, near plaintiff, an airsoft gun, and plaintiff made a joke about the airsoft gun being a real firearm. Plaintiff later clarified that it was not real and that he was joking. Plaintiff alleges that in November of 2021, plaintiff and his mother, Marta Recasens, met with Jordan to discuss what Jordan claimed was his and SFHSs investigation of the foregoing altercations and their aftermath. Jordan informed them that Jordan had a grainy photo of a gun that plaintiff had supposedly displayed on social media, but never presented this image to plaintiff or Recasens. Plaintiff alleges that during the investigation, Jordan did view the videotape where Aidan attacked plaintiff in the locker room, and interviewed other football players who informed him that plaintiff was being threatened and harassed by Aidan and that plaintiff feared for his life, but did not take proper measures to prevent, protect plaintiff or to properly punish Aidan, the aggressor. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff was under the authority of defendants as a student athlete who qualified to be in the football program and should have been afforded the protection of those authorities. The day following the meeting with Jordan, plaintiff and Recasen met with SFHSs Disciplinary Board, comprised of defendant Jordan, defendant Thomas Moran, Principal of SFHS, and six other individuals, in which plaintiff read a statement about the altercations and their aftermath, and admitted in his statement that within a week of Aidans most recent beating, plaintiff remembered having commented as a joke on social media that an airsoft gun the plaintiff owned was a real firearm. Plaintiff alleges that he contritely admitted this joke as inappropriate and asked forgiveness. Plaintiff was then expelled. Plaintiff alleges that had defendants acted more promptly in disciplining and either suspending or expelling Aidan prior to the last assault on plaintiff, plaintiff would not have been frightened and intimidated into joking that the airsoft gun was real, which joke led to plaintiffs expulsion. The First Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiff has been damaged as a result of his expulsion, including mental suffering, the loss of the companionship and society of teachers and friends at SFHS, and due to the disciplinary record created with the expulsion, finding it difficult to be accepted as a student at a comparable religious high school and, later, colleges. Plaintiff also alleges that at the new high school in which plaintiff enrolled, he was not allowed to play football for one year due to CIF rules, despite being told by Jordan that no such disciplinary reasons statement would appear on plaintiffs record. In contrast, Aidan, who was not expelled but suspended, and transferred to a different school, was allowed to participate in football after only six months. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff appealed the expulsion ruling to CIF explaining the circ*mstances, but CIF would not change its decision. Plaintiff alleges that CIF failed to properly investigate the matter after it failed to protect plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that prior to Aidans attacks, plaintiff had been an honor roll student, but his academic career was damaged when he failed courses because of the stress he endured from the bullying, beating and expulsion, that plaintiffs football career was harmed as he was not able to play football for over a year, and that plaintiff as a result of the beatings and expulsion, suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. The FAC also names as defendant Antonio Marti, the President of SFHS. The FAC alleges that all defendants other than Aidan breached their duty of properly supervising Aidan to ensure that he did not bully or physically abuse plaintiff, and breached their duty by failing to suspend or expel Aidan when Aidan repeatedly battered plaintiff, and that CIF breached its duty to provide protection for plaintiff by not instituting rules and guidelines on bullying and breached its duty in not ensuring that Aidan received the same consequences as plaintiff. The FAC alleges causes of action against Aidan only for IIED and battery. The file shows that on November 27, 2024, the moving defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint. Defendant CIF filed a demurrer to the complaint, which was heard on April 12, 2024, and was sustained with leave to amend as to the first cause of action for negligence and second cause of action for NIED. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on May 20, 2024. Defendant CIF again filed a demurrer to the first and second causes of action of the FAC, which was heard on July 12, 2024. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. ANALYSIS: Procedural Untimely Opposition Defendants in the reply argue that the court should disregard the opposition papers because they were untimely. Under CCP §1005(b): All papers opposing a motion&shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days& before the hearing. Under CRC Rule 3.1300(d), If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate. Here, the opposition was filed and served on July 10, 2024 at 4:30 pm for a July 19, 2024 hearing date. Nine court days before the hearing fell on July 8, 2024. The opposition was accordingly filed and served two court days late. This tardiness has been inconvenient for the court and the courtroom staff, and unfair to the moving parties who have been deprived of those court days within which to file a timely reply. The court, in its discretion, could refuse to consider the untimely opposition, but the court elects not to do so. The court will consider the opposition, only because defendants were able to file a timely reply. However, plaintiff is cautioned that in the future the court may refuse to consider papers not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. No Previous Demurrer As noted above, the moving defendants did not previously file a demurrer to the original complaint but filed an answer. The FAC was only permitted to be filed because co-defendant CIF had successfully brought a demurrer to the original pleading, and plaintiff was permitted leave to amend. Under CCP § 430.41(b): (b) A party demurring to a pleading that has been amended after a demurrer to an earlier version of the pleading was sustained shall not demur to any portion of the amended complaint, cross-complaint, or answer on grounds that could have been raised by demurrer to the earlier version of the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer. The allegations against the moving defendants do not appear to have been significantly modified in the FAC, and it appears that the arguments now made by moving defendants could have been raised in connection with the original complaint but were not. The moving papers do not explain why a demurrer is now appropriate, when moving defendants did not previously argue that plaintiffs pleading was insufficient. The court will hear argument whether it should disregard the demurrer for failure to comply with CCP § 430.41(b). However, the court will consider the demurrer on its merits. Again, the parties are cautioned that the court in the future may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. Substantive First Cause of ActionNegligence and Second Cause of ActionNIED Defendants Saint Francis High School (SFHS) and individual defendants Antonio Marti, Thomas Moran and John Jordan demur to the two causes of action brought against them for negligence and NIED, without a clear discussion of each cause of action. Defendants argue that the FAC does not allege any facts showing that plaintiff has any viable negligence-based causes of action against defendants, as SFHS cannot be held liable for plaintiffs own conduct which plaintiff admits in the FAC led to his expulsion. Essentially, defendants seem to argue that defendants did not have a legal duty to plaintiff to protect plaintiff from his own poor choices. The argument appears to be more specifically that plaintiffs theory of liability against SFHS is too attenuated to create a duty on the part of SFHS. To plead a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: The existence of a duty of care, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach. Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917. Negligent infliction of emotional distress requires negligence and severe emotional disturbance. Marlene F. v. Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 588. To support a NIED claim here, plaintiff must have suffered damages as a result of a duty assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the two. Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1073, quoting Marlene F., at 590. See also Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984-985 (That duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship&) It is recognized that the issue of whether a duty of care was owed is a question of law. See Clarke v. Hoek (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 208, 213 (The question of the existence of a legal duty of care in a given factual situation presents a question of law which is to be determined by the courts alone.). Garcia v. Paramount Citrus Association, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1452 (The existence of a duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is a question of law for the court, reviewed de novo on appeal.) Defendants argue that foreseeability is of primary importance in establishing the element of duty, and that no supervision is required where the school has no reason to think any is required. Defendants argue that the allegations are too attenuated here that plaintiff made a joke about an airgun being a real firearm and had defendants acted more promptly in disciplining defendant Aidan prior to the last assault on plaintiff, plaintiff would not have made the comment about the gun which caused plaintiff to be expelled. The argument seems to be that defendants had no specific duty concerning preventing plaintiff from admitting he had made an improper representation concerning the air gun. However, the duty and breaches of duty alleged in the pleading include various other conduct and wrongs which have nothing to do with this theory. Specifically, the first cause of action alleges that defendants owed SFHS students a duty to exercise reasonable care and to take reasonable steps to protect said students from bullying, including without limitation by (a) adequately supervising students to ensure that no bullying or other improper physical abuse by students occurs against other students, and (b) suspending or expelling other students who have engaged, even once, in battery of other students. [FAC, para.54]. The cause of action alleges that defendants breached their duty by not properly supervising AIDAN to ensure that he did not bully and/or physically abuse Plaintiff. [FAC, para. 60]. It is also alleged that plaintiff was harmed including that his mental state suffered, and he felt threatened by Aidan. [FAC, para. 62]. The general allegations include detailed allegations concerning three bullying batteries by Aidan against plaintiff. The first two incidents, defendants are alleged to have been clearly aware of, and defendants are alleged to have failed to properly investigate and act on those incidents, when there was video evidence showing that plaintiff had no responsibility for the encounters, and should not have been disciplined, and Aidan, as the aggressor, should have been disciplined more seriously. [FAC, paras. 22-26; 31-34, 38]. Both sides rely on Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, in which the court of appeal reversed the trial courts sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend to an amended complaint brought by a high school student against his school district and his high schools principal and wrestling coach, alleging they had failed to protect him from an attack by a non-student in a high school restroom. The court of appeal held: In this case, we hold that the complaint of a high school student states a cause of action for damages against his school district and its employees. The complaint alleges employees of the district negligently failed to protect plaintiff Jaime Leger from an attack by a nonstudent in a school restroom, where they knew or reasonably should have known the restroom was unsafe and attacks by nonstudents were likely to occur. Leger, at 1452-1453. The court of appeal described the duty of care arising in the school setting as follows: As a general rule, one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct. Such a duty may arise, however, if '(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.' (Rest. 2d Torts (1965) § 315; Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 751-752 [167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166].) (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894]; see also Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 788-789 [221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 710 P.2d 907]; Williams v. State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 23.) In Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707 [230 Cal.Rptr. 823], the court considered whether a school district could be held liable when a student was assaulted on campus by a nonstudent. On the question of duty, the court concluded that a special relationship is formed between a school district and its students so as to impose an affirmative duty on the district to take all reasonable steps to protect its students. (P. 715.). Although Rodriguez did not address the question, we think it obvious that the individual school employees responsible for supervising plaintiff, such as the principal and the wrestling coach, also had a special relation with plaintiff upon which a duty of care may be founded. (See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 436.) A contrary conclusion would be wholly untenable in light of the fact that the right of all students to a school environment fit for learning cannot be questioned. Attendance is mandatory and the aim of all schools is to teach. Teaching and learning cannot take place without the physical and mental well-being of the students. The school premises, in short, must be safe and welcoming. ... [¶] The public school setting is one in which governmental officials are directly in charge of children and their environs, including where they study, eat and play. ... Further, the responsibility of school officials for each of their charges, the children, is heightened as compared to the responsibility of the police for the public in general. (In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 563 [221 Cal.Rptr. 118, 709 P.2d 1287].) Rodriguez notwithstanding, defendants still contend they should owe no duty to protect plaintiff from this attack. They correctly contend that neither school districts nor their employees are the insurers of the safety of their students. (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747 [87 Cal.Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360].) But plaintiff makes no assertion of strict liability; rather, the complaint pleads negligence. Defendants do owe plaintiff a duty to use the degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with comparable duties, would exercise in the same circ*mstances. (Ibid.) Of course, in the present circ*mstances, the existence of a duty of care depends in part on whether the harm to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable. (See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 125 [211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653].) Neither schools nor their restrooms are dangerous places per se. (Cf. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 812.) Students are not at risk merely because they are at school. (See Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School Dist. (1979) 122 Ariz. 472 [595 P.2d 1017, 1 A.L.R.4th 1099].) A contrary conclusion would unreasonably require virtual round-the-clock supervision or prison-tight security for school premises, ... (Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 492, 500 [147 Cal.Rptr. 898].) Here, however, plaintiff's first amended complaint pled that defendants knew or should have known that he was subject to an unusual risk of harm at a specific location on school grounds. Thus, the complaint alleged defendants knew or should have known that members of the junior varsity wrestling team (including plaintiff) were changing clothes before wrestling practice in the unsupervised boys' restroom, that defendants knew or should have known the unsupervised restroom was unsafe for students, and that attacks were likely to occur there. These allegations sufficiently state that the harm to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable in the absence of supervision or a warning. Plaintiff had no obligation to plead that prior acts of violence had occurred in the restroom. (See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 129.) For example, school authorities who know of threats of violence that they believe are well-founded may not refrain from taking reasonable preventive measures simply because violence has yet to occur. (See id., at pp. 125-126.) Whether plaintiff can prove these allegations, or whether it will be difficult to prove them, are not appropriate questions for a reviewing court when ruling on a demurrer. (Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 929, 936 [231 Cal.Rptr. 748, 727 P.2d 1029].) Leger, at 1458-1460. The court of appeal also directly addressed the question of whether a private school, which is not a public school, is subject to a similar duty of care and concluded private schools have such a duty: As a general rule, it has been held that a [private] school is not required to provide constant supervision over pupils at all times. Thus, no supervision is required where the school has no reason to think any is required. ... It appears that a [private] school has a duty to provide supervision with respect to a particular activity if the school officials could reasonably anticipate that supervision was required .... (Annot., Tort Liability of Private Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning for Negligence of, or Lack of Supervision By, Teachers and Other Employees or Agents (1971) 38 A.L.R.3d 908, 916, fns. omitted; italics added.) Where a student is injured in performing a task on the direction of school authorities without supervision, the question of [private] school negligence is one for the jury if there is evidence of the existence of a danger known to the school authorities, who neglect to guard the student against such danger, or if there is an unknown danger which the school, by the exercise of ordinary care as a reasonably prudent person, would have discovered. (38 A.L.R.3d at p. 919, fn. omitted.) Where the liability of the [private] school is sought to be predicated on alleged negligence of teachers or other employees or agents of the school, it is generally recognized that liability on the part of the school may be established under the doctrine of respondeat superior if negligence within the scope of their employment is shown. (38 A.L.R.3d at p. 912.). Leger, at 1461-1462 Overall, the FAC here similarly alleges breaches of a duty of supervision of students, in this case an actual student as opposed to a non-student, and circ*mstances showing that the school was aware of violent behavior by the student against plaintiff, but failed to appropriately investigate, or appropriately discipline the aggressor, or take steps to monitor the locker room or promptly review and act on videotapes of incidents of assault, so that subsequent attacks are appropriately viewed as foreseeable. [FAC, paras. 22-26, 31-34, 38]. A negligence claim against SFHS is alleged on at least one valid recognized theory in the very case law cited by defendants, which is sufficient to withstand demurrer. Specifically, to the extent defendants focus on the expulsion aspect of the causes of action, this goes to only part of the causes of action, and the court may not sustain a demurrer to only part of a cause of action. A demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action (or to a particular type of damage or remedy), and a cause will survive demurrer if there are sufficient allegations that might entitle the pleader to relief. Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelop. Agency (2003, 2nd Dist.) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046; PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682. The demurrer accordingly is overruled on this ground. Defendants also seem to argue that because plaintiff did not report the November 5, 2021 incident involving Aidan, the school had no awareness of the incident until later, so there was no foreseeability. However, as pointed out in the opposition, and discussed above, the FAC alleges in some depth that defendants were aware of previous incidents between these very two students, and failed to appropriately investigate and determine that Aidan had been the aggressor and was routinely threatening and assaulting plaintiff. It is alleged that during the investigation, defendant Dean of Students Jordan interviewed other football players who informed him that plaintiff was being threatened and harassed by Aidan and that plaintiff feared for his life, but did not take proper measures to prevent, protect plaintiff or to properly punish Aidan, the aggressor. [FAC, paras. 22-26; 31-34, 38]. This showing is sufficient to allege facts supporting foreseeability. In fact, in Leger, the court of appeal observed that plaintiff in that case had no obligation to plead prior acts of violence had occurred, as school authorities who know of threats of violence that they believe are well-founded may not refrain from taking reasonable preventive measure simply because violence has yet to occur. Leger, at 1460. Here, previous acts of violence themselves were known to defendants. The claim is sufficiently pleaded. The individual defendants argue that the demurrer should be sustained as to these parties because they were acting as directors or officers of the religious corporation which runs SFHS, acting while discharging their duties as agents or employees of the school. Defendants rely on general agency law, not cases involving schools, and concede that tort liability can be imposed on agents where acts constitute a breach of duty owed to the third person. As pointed out in the opposition, there is case law under which a special relationship is recognized between individual school employees and students such that a school employee may be individually responsible for a breach of duties arising pursuant to that relationship. See Leger, 1458-1459 (we think it obvious that the individual school employees responsible for supervising plaintiff, such as the principal and the wrestling coach, also had a special relation with plaintiff upon which a duty of care may be founded.) Here, with respect to the individual defendants, it is alleged that defendant John Jordan, the Dean of Students, was directly involved in handling the alleged incidents of aggression between plaintiff and Aidan, and failed to properly investigate, failed to view available evidence, or failed to act on it once he viewed it, and failed to properly supervise and discipline in connection with harassment and threats of violence. [FAC, paras. 6, 26, 33, 38, 40, 43]. This showing is sufficient to withstand demurrer. Similarly, defendant Thomas Moran is alleged to have been principal of SFHS, to have participated in the Disciplinary Board meeting, and to have written a letter to plaintiffs mother improperly blaming plaintiff for not reporting the incidents, two of which the school was in fact aware, and admitting that video of the locker room incident had been available and viewed by Jordan. [FAC, paras. 5, 40, 43]. This showing is sufficient to allege a claim against this defendant. Defendants in reply argue that this is a private religious school, not a public school as was the case in authorities cited by plaintiff. However, defendants themselves rely on Leger, which involved a private school, and recognized duties owed based on special relationships with students in the school setting. As noted in Leger, where the liability specifically of a private school is sought to be predicated on alleged negligence of teachers or other employees or agents of the school, it is generally recognized that liability on the part of the school may be established under the doctrine of respondeat superior if negligence within the scope of their employment is shown. Leger, at 1462, quoting 38 A.L.R.3d at p. 912. The demurrer by defendants Jordan and Moran accordingly is overruled. However, it does not appear that any negligence or wrongful conduct is clearly alleged on the part of defendant Antonio Marti, other than that Marti was the president of SFHS, and vaguely, directly involved in the underlying events as alleged herein. [FAC, para. 4]. He is not identified by name in any other part of the FAC. The opposition does not separately address this named defendant, instead arguing that the FAC alleges that each of the individual defendants had a duty to plaintiff which was breached, as they were present during the expulsion proceeding and, in a position, to stop the attacks on plaintiff by Aidan. It is not alleged that this defendant was present at the hearing, or how defendant Marti was in a position to stop the attacks on plaintiff. The demurrer as to this defendant only accordingly is sustained. Since this is the first challenge to the pleading by this defendant, the demurrer is sustained with one opportunity to amend, if appropriate, to more clearly allege the alleged negligent conduct engaged in by defendant Marti. The opposition discusses at some length that defendants discriminated against plaintiff with their disparate handling of the situations before defendants. There is no cause of action alleged for discrimination. The current causes of action against the moving defendants are for negligence and NIED. To the extent the opposition seeks leave to amend to expand the disparate treatment and discrimination claims, such leave will not be granted. If plaintiff finds it appropriate to pursue new causes of action, or otherwise amend the pleading, plaintiff must appropriately seek and obtain advance leave of court to do so. RULING: Saint Francis High School of LaCanada-Flintridge, Antonio Marti, Thomas Moran and John Jordans Demurrer to First Amended Complaint: The Court in its discretion has reluctantly considered the untimely opposition to the demurrer, filed and served two court days late, only seven court days prior to the hearing. Plaintiff is cautioned that in the future the Court may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. The Court in its discretion has also reluctantly considered the demurrer itself, which was filed in violation of CCP § 430.41(b). Defendants are cautioned that in the future the Court may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. Demurrer by defendants Saint Francis High School of LaCanada-Flintridge, Thomas Moran, and John Jordan is OVERRULED. Demurrer by defendant Antonio Marti is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on the ground there are insufficient allegations of any conduct on the part of this defendant in support of a negligence claim. Ten days leave to amend only to assert negligent conduct on the part of defendant Antonio Marti, if possible. Plaintiff is not permitted to amend to add new causes of action, or to make further allegations against any of the other defendants without obtaining advance leave of court to do so. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.
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